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Karen Richmond, University of Dundee – Written evidence 
(FRS0101)
9. What role for should the Forensic Science Regulator have? If the 
Forensic Science Regulator is to have statutory powers, what should these 
be?
The decision to place the Office of the Forensic Science Regulator on a statutory 
basis has been welcomed by many forensic practitioners. However, the legal 
implications of the Forensic Science Bill – and the proposed ambit of the FSR - 
deserve closer scrutiny. A potential source of problems may be Section 2, 
subsections 1-2, which require the Regulator ‘to publish a code of practice about 
the carrying on of forensic science activities in England and Wales.’ (2)(a) states 
that the code must specify the ‘forensic science activities’ to which it applies. 
Meanwhile, sub-section (2)(b) allows that the Regulator ‘need not make provision 
about every ‘forensic science activity’. For the purposes of disambiguation, s.11 
goes on to explain the meaning of ‘forensic science activity’. A ‘forensic science 
activity’ – according to s.11(1) – is ‘any activity relating to the application of 
scientific methods…’ This inclusion might prove problematic.
Those academics and practitioners who have kept abreast of current developments 
in both the forensic science, and criminal justice, sectors may apprehend a potential 
flaw in the proposed legislation. In it’s current incarnation, this Bill would appear to 
be limited only to the regulation of forensic science providers carrying out certain 
forms of forensic DNA-profiling. The problem stems from the liberal application of 
the terms ‘science’, and ‘scientific method’. For, whilst DNA-profiling (at least in its 
routine forms) is, without doubt, a fully scientific forensic technique, many common 
forensic practices – particularly those involving the comparison of observable 
features – are not based upon discernible scientific methods. This latter category 
may include; fingerprint examination, bite-mark analysis, shoemark analysis, 
toolmark analysis, ballistic comparisons, unvalidated DNA mixture analysis, and 
hair analysis, to name but a few.
Similar problems relating to the scientific status of common forensic practices were 
addressed in a US report, in 2016. The PCAST (President’s Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology) Report, on ‘Forensic Science in The Criminal Courts’ found 
that many common techniques were not underpinned by reliable empirical studies 
that could establish the ‘foundational validity’, or reliability, of the technique. In 
other words, these techniques are not ‘science’. Until recently, there was no 
comparable legal requirement in the UK for admissible expert evidence to be based 
upon scientific method. However, that changed with the introduction of the 
amended Criminal Practice Directions, and attempts, on the part of the Regulator – 
using the regulatory guidance, and codes of conduct and standards – to ground 
forensic quality assurance in scientific method. These developments have gone 
largely unnoticed (save for some incisive academic comment from Professor Ward), 
and deserve further scrutiny.
The starting point for an elaboration, and critique, of the FSR’s position, is the Law 
Commission Report, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales, 
which, in 2011, recommended the introduction of a statutory ‘reliability’ test for 
determining the admissibility of expert evidence. The commission recommended 
that admissibility be assessed by way of an enhanced ‘Daubert’ test, of the sort 
encountered in the US (see below). In the various jurisdictions of the UK, the role 
of the expert witness has traditionally been framed fairly broadly, in terms of the 
expert’s ability to assist the court (and such experts could include scientists, 
individuals with specialist knowledge, and those possessing particular skills). 
However, the criteria for admissibility of expert opinion evidence, articulated in 
the American courts, differed greatly.
The US courts used to uniformly follow the Frye standard (Frye v. United States, 
293 F 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which holds that expert testimony based upon 
scientific techniques is only admissible when these techniques have become 
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. However, following the 
judgement in Daubert v Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 U.S. 579 (1994), the 
Supreme Court amended Rule 702 (regarding the use of expert testimony) to 
introduce a new admissibility test. Within the preponderance of US states, all expert 
opinion evidence must now meet the Daubert standard, measured against five 
criteria. Daubert requires that, in judging the admissibility of expert evidence, the 
court must look to the underlying methods used, in order to assess:
 whether a method can or has been tested;
 the known or potential rate of error;
 whether the methods have been subjected to peer review;
 whether there are standards controlling the technique’s operation; and,
 the general acceptance of the method within the relevant community.
Thus, the American judge now exercises a gatekeeping function, and must ensure 
that all expert testimony ‘proceeds from scientific knowledge’. Indeed, the Daubert 
criteria may be viewed as a partial incorporation of Mertonian scientific norms. 
However, in practice, the introduction of the Daubert test caused a great many 
problems for certain types of forensic practitioner – particularly friction ridge 
examiners – whose methods were not consonant with scientific method. Therefore, 
in 1999, the test was extended to include methods based upon ‘technical’ 
knowledge [see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)].
Returning to the UK, the Law Commission’s proposals for an enhanced Daubert 
admissibility test, as recommended in 2011, failed to make provision for the forms 
of technological, or ‘non-scientific’ evidence, admitted in the US courts 
through Kumho. After consideration, the Law Commission’s recommendation was 
rejected by the Government, on economic grounds.  Therefore the common law 
rules on admissibility of expert evidence subsist. However, rejection did not spell 
the end for the ‘enhanced Daubert test’.
However, in 2014, the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Thomas) issued a Practice Direction 
(effective from 7th October 2014), containing the selfsame enhanced admissibility 
test. Thus, a test ‘recognisably derived from Daubert’, was ‘introduced to the courts 
by [a] somewhat unusual mechanism.’ [See Ward, T. An English Daubert? Law, 
Forensic Science and Epistemic Deference The Journal of Philosophy, Science & 
Law: Daubert Special Issue, Volume 15, May 29, 2015, pages 26-36]. The Criminal 
Practice Directions were also amended. Direction 19A3 acknowledged that the Law 
Commission declined to introduce an enhanced Daubert test.  It stated, 
however, that nothing prevents the courts from assessing admissibility at common 
law using Daubert Criteria. It went further, stating that 19A4 lists matters with 
which an experts report must deal in order for such an assessment to be carried out 
(see 19A4(h) below).
(h) [an expert report must] include such information as the court may need to 
decide whether the expert’s opinion is sufficiently reliable to be admissible as 
evidence;
Thus admissibility becomes inextricably linked to scientific reliability. This may 
appear unproblematic, at least on the face of it. However, the attempts to ground a 
procedurally innovative Daubert test in domestic legal precedent are arguably 
misconceived. For example, the underlying guidance quotes a short passage from 
Dlugosz1, stating that the court must ensure ‘that there is a sufficiently reliable 
scientific basis for the evidence to be admitted.’ However, it may be argued that 
this obiter statement has been taken out of context. The discussion in Dlugosz 
centred around the evaluation of DNA profiles, a singularly ‘scientific’ evidence 
type. It is far from clear that the court intended this requirement to apply more 
widely, to all forms of forensic evidence.
Further, that inclusion from Dlugosz is itself founded upon the judgement in Reed2 , 
paragraphs 111-2, which specifically refers to appropriate admissibility criteria, to 
be used when dealing with ‘scientific evidence of a scientific nature…’.  It may be 
readily inferred, and rightly, that there are other forms of non-scientific evidence, 
and that these non-scientific evidence types may be judged by other criteria. This 
distinction has become lost along the way – forensic practitioners are now faced 
with the problem of negotiating a common-law, practice-based, set of admissibility 
criteria, which require that all evidence – scientific, technical, or otherwise – are 
based upon reliable scientific methods (as laid out in Daubert).
To return to Rule 19.4, this states that a report ‘must include such information as 
the court may need to decide whether the expert’s opinion is sufficiently reliable to 
be admissible as evidence;’ Therefore, in light of the directions above, it may be 
stated that forensic reports must contain substantive evidence of the conformity, of 
the methods used within the report, with scientific method vis-à-vis the enhanced 
Daubert criteria. It may be further inferred, that forensic reports must contain 
substantive evidence of the conformity of the evaluative report itself with scientific 
method vis-à-vis the enhanced Daubert criteria.
1 R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2
2 R v Reed, Reed & Garmson [2009] EWCA Crim LR 2698,
Alongside the above requirements, laid out in the Criminal Practice Rules (and 
associated Directions), the Forensic Science Regulator ‘suggests’, in her guidance 
that the courts determine the issue of whether expert evidence is ‘sufficiently 
reliable’ with reference to the presence, or otherwise, of accreditation (amongst 
other things). Further, that all methods – standard, or novel – be validated, and 
that all validations (whether in reports or as the basis of expert opinion) ‘consider’ 
19A5 of the Criminal Practice Directions. As seen above, these Practice Directions 
are based on the ‘enhanced Daubert’ criteria. Therefore, the validity, hence 
soundness, of expert methods are directly referable to ‘enhanced Daubert’ criteria. 
And those, as has been shown, are based upon scientific method.
The above demonstrates another instance of the tendency to view the palette of 
forensic techniques as being co-extensive with scientific method. However, in the 
absence of reliable empirical studies that can establish the ‘foundational validity’, or 
reliability, of the techniques involved, many of these techniques would be unable to 
surmount the regulatory hurdle.
Similar problems afflict the current Bill. The Forensic Science Regulator Act makes 
provision for the investigation of Forensic Science Providers, and the issuing of a 
Compliance Notice (see Section 6(2)). Since such notices may be the subject of an 
Appeal to the First Tier Tribunal – on the grounds that the decision was wrong in 
law (Section 8(2)(b)) – it is not unreasonable to predict a direct challenge to the 
definition of ‘forensic science activities’, and of the applicability of the term to a 
large number of forensic techniques. Should the Bill pass in its current form, that 
becomes a possibility.
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